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Abstract 
 
The ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach offers key insights into the institutional 
embeddedness of economic experiences.  It performs an important function in 
providing a conceptual framework for empirical analyses of the way in which the 
economy both manifests, and itself is a manifestation of, a whole series of different 
experiences.  However, I argue that the Ricardian themes evident in Hall and 
Soskice’s Varieties of Capitalism limit the potential effectiveness of the empirical 
analyses that the approach makes possible.  Within the context of this latent 
Ricardianism, the economy is understood to be international, and the important 
differences within the economic system are those between different national ‘models’.  
I expose such assumptions to critical scrutiny, both analytical and empirical, before 
offering the outline of an alternative basis on which to ground the ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ approach.  In contrast to the major themes of the Ricardian tradition, I 
argue for an approach that is sensitive to the social relations of production, the study 
of which requires political economists to transcend the artificial reification of ‘the 
national’ as a discrete unit of economic analysis. 
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“Ricardian Political Economy and the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ Approach: 
Specialisation, Trade and Comparative Institutional Advantage” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
There is much to commend in the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach as pioneered by 
Peter Hall and David Soskice.  Analytically, it provides us with a means of framing 
the most important questions of contemporary political economy beyond the popular 
association of globalisation with an institutional monoculture for the regulation of 
economic affairs.  Normatively, it releases us from the political fatalism of the 
presumed neoliberal logic of no alternative that so frequently accompanies the prior 
assertion of truly global economic conditions.  Indeed, it allows us to transcend 
altogether the tendential reification of ‘the international’ as a discrete spatial scale of 
economic activity.  The ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach negates the temptation to 
try to construct truly systemic explanations of capitalist development. 
 
For each of these reasons, the contribution that the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach 
makes to our understanding of the economy is considerable.  As such, it would be 
unnecessarily churlish to use the pages that follow to question the overall usefulness 
of that approach.  I do not seek to challenge the ends of Hall and Soskice’s work, 
whereby they present to us a world in which alternative social bases of organising 
capitalist economies freely co-exist.  My critique is limited to the means through 
which they present such a world.  In particular, I question the utility of the Ricardian 
themes that are evident in the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach.1
                                                 
1 I maintain that a latent Ricardianism is evident throughout the Hall and Soskice approach due to the 
explanatory significance that is attached to the concept of comparative advantage, despite there being 
no reference to Ricardo’s published work in the bibliography of Varieties of Capitalism. 
  While accepting the 
empirical fact that contemporary capitalism sustains a variety of economic 
experiences, I argue that the appeal to Ricardian ideas of specialisation, trade and 
 3 
comparative advantage is not the most effective way of explaining the existence of 
such variety. 
 
 
 
 
Reifying ‘the National’ in Ricardian Theory 
 
The ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach offers much in its ability to move us beyond the 
tendential reification of ‘the international’ as a discrete spatial scale of economic 
activity.  It reminds us that there are particular geographies of production and 
consumption, which represent embedded networks of economic activity that are 
limited both socially and spatially.  Spatial scales become more than arbitrary 
territorial distinctions only at those moments in which they have social significance 
conferred upon them by way of the human interactions that take place at those scales.  
From our own experiences of the world, we know that most of the economic relations 
in which we engage occur at spatial scales other than ‘the international’.  However, 
there is a danger, evident in much of the comparative political economy literature on 
national ‘models’ of capitalism, of responding to this observation simply by replacing 
one reified spatial scale with another.  The fact that the majority of economic activity 
is not conducted at the international level does not, as a consequence, obviate the need 
to think outside the terms of discrete and autonomously constituted national 
economies.  It remains unclear whether such a task is possible within an analytical 
framework that allows each country to possess its own national variant of capitalism. 
 
This is not to accuse Hall and Soskice directly of restricting their analysis solely to 
that of discrete and autonomously constituted national economies.  Yet, it is 
noticeable within much of the comparative political economy literature, which 
operationalises their conceptual ideal-types of liberal market and co-ordinated market 
capitalism, that each national economy tends to be treated as a separate variant of one 
of the two ideal-types.  The distinctiveness of each national ‘model’ is assumed to 
reflect differences between the institutional organisation of its economy and that of 
the ideal-type it most closely resembles.  If Hall and Soskice cannot be accused 
directly of restricting their analysis to that of autonomously constituted national 
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economies, their mode of thinking has allowed those who have attempted empirically 
to operationalise its core claims to overplay such autonomy. 
 
This tendency has taken three forms.  Firstly, in the hands of some, all of the separate 
national ‘models’ of capitalism come to be treated as ideal-types in their own right – 
or, at the very least, as ideal-subtypes (e.g., we hear frequent references to the German 
Model, the Swedish Model, etc).  Secondly, in the hands of others, different levels of 
abstraction are conflated, with claims relating to the conceptual ideal-subtypes being 
presented as a valid description of the institutional features of the economy in 
question (e.g., the debate about the continued existence of the Swedish Model tends to 
contrast current conditions in Sweden with an ideal-type that is assumed to 
approximate past conditions).  Thirdly, comparisons across country cases are less 
common than contrasts between them (e.g., it is more usual to focus on institutional 
specificities that lead to distinctive experiences in one country than it is to focus on 
institutional similarities that lead to common experiences in a range of countries – see 
Strange 1997: 183). 
 
I attribute this tendency to the economic model which is implicit in the ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ approach.  Despite there being no explicit recognition of the fact in the 
work of Hall and Soskice, the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach is unmistakably 
Ricardian in the language, image and intuitive appeal of its core conceptualisations.  It 
seeks to explain “the institutional foundations of comparative advantage”2
 
 and, in 
common with Ricardo’s reflections on that theme, it does so through reference to the 
dynamics of specialisation and trade. 
Ricardo’s classic model of international trade is built upon the assumption of a two 
economy/two good world, in which the economies are closed at the point of 
production but open at the point of exchange (see Ricardo 1891 [1911]: 77-93).  
Trade is assumed to take place only after each economy has specialised its production 
in one good at the expense of production in the other. 
 
                                                 
2 Indeed, this is the subtitle of Hall and Soskice’s book. 
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The question of who produces what is reduced to that of the relative efficiency of the 
input of labour into the production process (Sraffa 1951), where the social basis of 
labour productivity remains unexplored.  The social relations of production are 
something of a black box in Ricardian accounts of the economy, as economic 
causality is situated at the level of exchange rather than that of production.  This is 
significant for an appraisal of the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach as it embodies so 
many Ricardian themes, and it is a point to which I return in my concluding 
comments.  For now, however, I will continue with the current line of argument.  For, 
the limitations of Ricardian analysis quite clearly feed through into the ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ approach in a number of other ways. 
 
The Ricardian model of international trade operates on the assumption that the 
geographical limits of factor mobility correspond perfectly to the territorial limits of 
the national economy (see, for instance, Backhouse 1994:77; Blaug 1996: 118).  Land 
is clearly fixed geographically, and the history of international politics has served to 
ensure that we conventionally think of the territorial division of land into socio-legal 
entities called nation states.  However, the same assumption is also made in terms of 
labour and capital.  Within such a schema, the only way in which we can expect trade 
to take place is through specialisation and the subsequent increase in economic 
welfare that accrues from the mutual exchange of goods made within specialist 
production regimes. 
 
Specialisation is thus the logical corollary of comparative advantage.  Yet, it also 
implies the existence of discrete and independently formed national economies.  In 
the absence of such economies it would be impossible to talk about specialisation.  
For Ricardians, specialisation requires the subsequent institutionalisation of 
differences in the structure of national economies just as surely as, for Ricardo 
himself, it required the prior existence of comparative advantage within the 
production regime (Ricardo 1819 [1911]: 81).  In this way, Ricardian analysis, which 
is founded upon the assumption of specialisation and trade, reifies ‘the national’ in 
our study of economic processes. 
 
This is significant, for it allows those that have followed in the Ricardian tradition of 
the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach to focus primarily on the institutional 
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specificities of differentiated growth trajectories across the capitalist world (see, for 
example, Goldthorpe 1984; Berger and Dore 1996; Kitschelt et al 1999).  This is not 
to say that such studies are unwarranted.3  The problem, however, is when this leads 
to the elision of two different arguments that exist at two very different levels of 
abstraction.  The empirical analysis of the experience of institutional specificities is 
all too often conflated with conceptual claims about the existence of distinct national 
‘models’ of capitalism.  Indeed, the issue may be even more serious than this.  
Conceptual claims about the existence of distinct national capitalisms are often treated 
as if they were empirical analyses of actual economic experiences.  In this way, the 
significance of institutional differences at the level of the national economy are 
frequently asserted,4
 
 rather than being suggested as a hypothesis awaiting empirical 
investigation. 
This brings us to the core of the critique of all analyses that follow the tradition of 
Ricardian political economy.  Ricardo bequeathed to us not only a series of novel 
characterisations of economic issues, such as international trade, with which political 
economists had long been wrestling.  He was also responsible for delivering a new 
way of thinking about economic processes in general.  It is surely no exaggeration to 
suggest that Ricardo redefined the terms of what it meant to be an economist.  
According to the eminent historian of economic thought, Mark Blaug, Ricardo 
“literally invented the technique of economics” (Blaug 1996: 132) – or, at the very 
least, the economics with which we are familiar today.  A similar appraisal of the 
significance of Ricardo’s contribution to economic methodology is evident in the 
work of Joan Robinson, who describes his “habit of thought” as his “precious 
heritage” for economists (cited in Hutchison 1994: 88).  That heritage has been to 
reduce orthodox economics to the presentation of taxonomic or classificatory schema, 
in which a range of purely hypothetical models are established, typically with little 
regard for the models’ applicability to the real world (Hollander 1979).  The 
simplifying assumption is usually taken to be Ricardo’s trademark (Peach 1993), 
                                                 
3 It is certainly the case that I, for one, have found it useful to frame arguments within the context of 
‘institutional specificities’ when discussing the basis of different economic experiences – see Watson 
2001; Watson 2002. 
4 Furthermore, it is not unusual for them to be asserted with an assurance that is used to override 
contradictory empirical evidence. 
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along with a tendency to package the world into a series of mutually exclusive 
abstract categories (Schumpeter 1954). 
 
Ricardo’s world is an ‘either/or’ world, in which an economy displays either one set 
of characteristics or another.  It is this mode of thinking that allowed him to 
distinguish quite so clearly between one set of abstract characteristics that he took to 
be representative of the ‘English’ economy and another that he took to be 
representative of the ‘Portuguese’ economy.  It is also this mode of thinking that 
allowed him to construct his theory of comparative advantage on the basis of such 
distinctions.  Ricardo himself did not use the language of the English or the 
Portuguese ‘model’ in an attempt to render his abstractions ostensibly more concrete 
by presenting them as a short-hand description of actually existing economic 
conditions relating to the world production of cloth and wine (Ricardo 1819 [1991]: ).  
Yet, the same style of analysis, which seeks to emphasise national specificities within 
the world production regime on the basis of comparative advantage, is evident within 
the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach.  Moreover, within the terms of this latter 
approach, the appeal to distinct national ‘models’ is made as a matter of routine.  I 
turn in the following section to investigate the extent to which the existence of such 
‘models’ is confirmed within the empirical data.  
 
 
 
 
Specialisation, Trade and Comparative Advantage in Practice 
 
The tendency to prioritise conceptual abstractions at the expense of empirical 
indicators is, without doubt, the most frequently documented drawback of the 
Ricardian tradition of political economy.  In Schumpeter’s caustic phrase, the habit of 
applying highly simplified abstractions to the solution of practical problems is the 
‘Ricardian vice’ that has compromised economists’ thinking since the methodological 
conversion that followed the publication of Ricardo’s Principles (Schumpeter 1954).  
Nowhere is this more apparent than in Ricardo’s own work on comparative 
advantage. 
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Ricardo’s purported explanation of patterns of specialisation within the English and 
Portuguese economies is not really that at all.  At most, it is an explanation of how 
such patterns would arise were they to reflect nothing other than a simple economic 
logic.  As more recent historical scholarship has shown, the seventeenth century 
division of labour between English cloth-making and Portuguese wine-making is 
more readily explained by intra-European alliance building and, in particular, 
Portuguese attempts to guarantee British protection from Spain (Magdoff 1978).  The 
concessionary trade agreements that ensued allowed Britain to exploit the gold 
reserves of Portuguese colonies, especially those of Brazil.  The subsequent influx of 
capital flows into Britain was used to enhance existing productivity levels in 
technologically dynamic industries such as cloth-making, while the political 
recompense for increasing dependence on Britain was to favour Portuguese wine 
imports over French (McIntyre 1999: 248-9). 
 
Comparative advantage is ‘that to be explained’ (the explanandum), rather than ‘that 
doing the explaining’ (the explanans).  It is not some pre-given property of the 
economic system, so much as the contingent outcome of a series of social and 
political forces, which are likely to be historically limited to a particular moment of 
time.  It is necessary to specify the way in which comparative advantage is itself the 
creation of prior interventions designed to further some other political project, in 
order to view both economic specialisation and the comparative advantage on which it 
is ostensibly constructed as crucial components of the potential longevity of that 
project.  It is insufficient to treat comparative advantage as an unproblematic 
independent variable, simply asserting its existence and then reading off from that 
assertion subsequent patterns of specialisation and trade.  The comparative advantage 
of which Ricardo wrote was clearly more than the manifestation of an institutionalised 
economic logic, and for him to present it in such a way served merely to depoliticise 
the explanation of the observed division of labour.  Comparative advantage is not a 
politically neutral abstraction, which we can use unreflexively to facilitate clear-cut 
empirical examinations of the dynamics of specialisation and trade.  To the extent that 
we should be comfortable talking about comparative advantage at all, given the 
entirely abstract manner in which the concept is presented in Ricardian political 
economy, we must recognise that it is an empirical fact of politics itself. 
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I am sure that this is a claim to which Hall and Soskice would subscribe.  This would 
certainly seem to be so in their argument, to be found in the opening paragraph of 
their introductory chapter, that “differences in economic and political institutions” are 
to be explained as “the distillation of … durable historical choices for a specific kind 
of society” (p. 1).  However, it is still necessary to unpack the conception of ‘politics’ 
that animates their subsequent exposition.  Their later claim that “national patterns of 
specialisation in activities and products … reflect rational responses to the 
institutional frameworks identified here” (p. 41, emphases added) suggests a latent 
functionalism within their explanatory model (see Blyth in this issue for a similar 
argument).  The political choice to construct social institutions in one way, thus 
foregoing all possible alternatives, appears to be an epiphenomenon of a more 
essential economic logic.  In this respect, decisions relating to the socio-institutional 
organisation of the economy remain overwhelmingly technical in nature.  Politics is 
reduced to the struggle for the authority to impose efficient institutions for economic 
policy-making. 
 
However, there is a potential chronological contradiction to be explained when the 
conception of politics as the search for efficient institutions is set within an analytical 
framework that emphasises the significance of comparative advantage.  The 
assumption that existing institutional arrangements confer comparative advantage is 
read as evidence that such arrangements are efficient.  Yet, at most, this is an 
explanation of a reason for the continued reproduction of existing institutional 
arrangements.  It is certainly not an explanation of why the prevailing socio-
institutional settlement was forged in the first place.  To reiterate an earlier point, 
comparative advantage cannot be understood in the same way as other ‘natural 
endowments’ of the national economy, from which efficient socio-institutional 
settlements are simply read off. 
 
Valid though this objection to an unreflexive use of the concept of comparative 
advantage surely is, there is an even more fundamental objection that the ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ approach currently does little to negate.  In order to assess the true 
analytical value of the idea of comparative advantage on which so much of the 
‘varieties of capitalism’ approach hinges, we must examine not only the conceptual 
basis but also the empirical basis of the existence of comparative advantage.  This can 
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be achieved by mapping the cross-border flow of goods that constitute the prevailing 
pattern of international trade.  In the absence of obvious indicators of economic 
specialisation contained within the international trade statistics, it is unclear to what 
extent comparative advantage exists at all – at least in a practical sense. 
 
Yet, there are good reasons to expect that we will find no such evidence of clear-cut 
patterns of economic specialisation when we analyse the international trade figures.  
For a start, and as Hall and Soskice themselves concede, the intra-industry trade that 
now typifies the international trade regime sits uneasily alongside the assumption of 
sectoral specialisation on which Ricardian theories of comparative advantage are 
founded (p. 36).  Ricardo’s classical model focused solely on inter-industry rather 
than intra-industry trade (Ricardo 1819 [1911], chapter 7).  If this is indeed the world 
that we experience, this should show through in trade figures where one economy 
specialises production in one category of goods, and then engages in reciprocal 
trading relationships with other economies that specialise in producing other 
categories of goods.  But this is not what the figures show.  Trade takes place 
overwhelmingly within the same categories of goods and not across different 
categories of goods (IMF 2001).  The same country tends to be both an exporter and 
an importer of the same types of goods.  What is traded is not good X for good Y, but 
marginal characteristics of the same good to meet niche consumer preferences formed 
on the basis of product differentiation and preference-shaping marketing techniques.  
The assumption of comparative advantage would not appear to be appropriate in such 
circumstances. 
 
Second, much of the recent growth in international trade is accounted for by the 
increasing significance of intra-firm trade.  This trend must be viewed alongside the 
increasing proportion of foreign direct investment flows that now take the form of 
capital acquisitions.  Such dynamics have been triggered by attempts to lessen larger 
firms’ exposure to external tariff barriers imposed on final products.  Trade between 
different parts of the same firm occurs in order to complete the process through which 
such barriers are avoided.  Unfinished products are exported from one part of a firm to 
another, so that the final stage of the production process takes place in the country in 
which the product is to be sold. 
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To offer some indication of the scale of such activities, intra-firm trade involving US 
multinationals equates to around one-third of all American cross-border trade (Wade 
1996: 64).  On the basis of this finding alone, it is possible to argue that production 
has become more sensitive to an international division of labour (Barff 1995).  Given 
the existence of appropriate economies of scale, the labour-intensive parts of the 
production process tend to be located where labour costs are low, while the capital-
intensive parts of the production process tend to be located where suitable skills are in 
ready supply, irrespective of their cost.  However, such dynamics cannot be 
understood within Ricardian models of comparative advantage, as such models are 
based on the assumption that capital is immobile across countries (see, for instance, 
Backhouse 1994:77; Blaug 1996: 118). 
 
So, given these two major qualifications, is there any empirical basis on which to 
construct the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach on Ricardian models of comparative 
advantage?  The logic of Hall and Soskice’s position would seem to be clear in this 
respect.  Given their assumption that there are institutional foundations of 
comparative advantage, so long as we can work with reliable indicators of 
institutional difference, we should expect that the greater the institutional difference 
between two countries the more distinct their patterns of economic specialisation will 
be.  As a consequence, we should expect a greater level of trade between such 
economies. 
 
Indicators of institutional difference are available in order to construct empirical tests 
of this nature.  For the first two diagrams below, I use a standard de-commodification 
index5
                                                 
5 Source: SSIB data file. 
 as a proxy for institutional difference.  The greater the difference on the de-
commodification index between two countries, the more varied we can assume the 
socio-institutional bases of their economies to be.  The differences in the de-
commodification index for eighteen advanced industrialised economies are plotted on 
the horizontal axis of diagrams 1 and 2 below.  On the vertical axis I plot a trade 
weighted index, which controls for the size of the importing economy.  The 
percentage of one country’s exports that are imported by another country are divided 
by the latter country’s share of the total imports of all eighteen countries, before being 
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multiplied by one hundred to give the final trade weighted score.  A score of 100 
shows that the extent of trade between an exporting and an importing country is 
exactly equal to the importing country’s percentage share of all eighteen countries’ 
import sectors.  A score above 100 shows that a more than proportional amount of 
trade takes place between the exporting and the importing country; a score below 100 
shows that a less than proportional amount of trade takes place between the two 
countries. 
 
The timeframe for the data points was chosen deliberately in order to increase the 
chances of finding evidence of specialisation and trade consistent with the 
assumptions of Ricardian comparative advantage.  While the ‘varieties of capitalism’ 
literature is divided on the extent to which pressures associated with globalisation are 
eroding the distinctiveness of established national models of capitalism, it tends to be 
united on the assumption that such models existed pre-globalisation.  It is for this 
reason that the data is drawn from 1982, prior to the onset of globalisation.  If it is to 
show evidence of specialisation and trade consistent with the assumptions of 
Ricardian comparative advantage, we should see an obvious pattern in the data points.  
A de-commodification ‘distance’ of zero represents each country’s mean, and the 
trade weighted index should be distributed around the mean with a clear inverse 
kurtosis.  In other words, the data points should indicate high scores on the trade 
weighted index at either extreme of the distribution, falling progressively towards 
zero as the mean is approached.  The ensuing ‘U’-shaped curve would reflect 
specialisation founded on socio-institutional difference: the more profound the 
difference, the more distinct the specialisation. 
 
However, as the results for the eighteen advanced industrialised economies in the 
sample appear to suggest, there is no obvious concentration of trade between 
countries whose economies are most institutionally dissimilar, and whose institutions 
therefore provide for the most distinct forms of economic specialisation.  The 
conclusion to be drawn from diagram 1, then, is that there is little, if any, empirical 
basis to sustain claims about the institutional foundations of comparative advantage.  
This is even more graphically illustrated in diagram 2, in which the linear trend lines 
for each of the eighteen countries’ individual distribution are drawn against those 
countries’ data points.  Here, the overall impression is not of the smooth ‘U’-shaped 
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curve that would be consistent with Ricardian assumptions of comparative advantage, 
but of the exact opposite.  The aggregate distribution has a normal, rather than an 
inverted, kurtosis. 
 
[Insert diagrams 1 & 2 at this point.] 
 
Much the same conclusion emerges if we aggregate the eighteen countries in the 
sample into three clusters on the basis of institutional similarities.  This is easily done, 
as the eighteen countries are the welfare states that Gøsta Esping-Andersen divides 
equally into liberal, conservative and social democratic regime types (Esping-
Andersen 1990).  The results of this test are presented in diagrams 3, 4 and 5 below, 
which show each country’s trade with, respectively, the liberal, conservative and 
social democratic clusters.  Once again, the size of each country’s traded sector is 
controlled for, by using the same method for calculating the trade weighted index as 
before. 
 
For both the liberal and the social democratic clusters (diagrams 3 and 5), the linear 
trendline runs in the opposite direction to that which we would expect were the 
patterns of specialisation and trade to be consistent with the assumption that there are 
institutional foundations of comparative advantage.  Both clusters, in aggregate, trade 
proportionately more with countries that are institutionally similar than with countries 
that are institutionally dissimilar.  That is, they trade proportionately more with 
countries whose institutional frameworks do not provide the basis for distinct patterns 
of economic specialisation than those that do. 
 
Only the conservative regime cluster fails to entirely contradict the predictions of the 
Ricardian approach to comparative institutional advantage, and then only partially so.  
As diagram 4 indicates, trade is not as concentrated within the conservative cluster as 
it is within the liberal and the social democratic clusters.  Indeed, inter-cluster trade 
from the conservative to the social democratic cluster is more pronounced than intra-
cluster trade within the conservative cluster.  However, this pattern of trading, which 
at least partially conforms to the assumption that there are institutional foundations of 
comparative advantage, is not replicated in the trading relations between the 
conservative and the liberal clusters. 
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[Insert diagrams 3, 4 & 5 at this point.]  
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Let me end in the same way as I began.  Despite both the conceptual and empirical 
limitations of basing the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach on Ricardian models of 
comparative advantage, Hall and Soskice’s work continues to be of enduring 
significance, as it allows us to transcend the assumption that there is a single systemic 
logic of capitalist development.  My objections are not to the goals of the research 
agenda in Hall and Soskice’s volume, but to the means that they adopt to meet those 
goals. 
 
By grounding the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach on Ricardian models of 
comparative advantage, Hall and Soskice locate differences in capitalist experience 
solely at the level of the national economy.  All other sources of differentiated 
experience within the national economic ‘model’, in particular those that arise from 
within the social relations of production, are in danger of being overlooked.  Indeed, 
in Ricardian accounts of the economy, all causality is situated at the level of exchange 
rather than that of production, thus rendering discussion of the social relations of 
production superfluous to the analysis. 
 
Yet, it is from the position that people occupy within the social relations of production 
that is the foremost influence shaping their experience of capitalism, not the country 
in which they live.  Let us be clear that a single national ‘model’ of capitalism 
sustains a whole range of different experiences of the economy, depending upon the 
way in which different people are socialised into the economy, as well as being 
socialised into expecting to perform particular types of economic roles.  Thus, the 
difference between being, for instance, a protected or an unprotected worker, 
university or non-university educated, employed in new economy or old economy 
sectors, in manufacturing, finance, agriculture or the service sector, matters at least as 
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much to the experience of the economy as where in the advanced industrialised world 
that experience takes place. 
 
Such differences are obscured by the way in which the ‘national’ spatial scale is 
reified within Ricardian theory.  The ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach is limited by 
the extent to which its focus on national ‘models’ of capitalism allows fundamental 
features of the social structure of accumulation – e.g., those activated along the lines 
of class, race and gender differences – to remain unexplored.  The task that lies ahead 
is to find alternative conceptual foundations for the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach 
that enable such features to be integrated into the analysis. 
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Table 1: TRADE WEIGHTING OF 18 COUNTRIES WITH ONE ANOTHER, 1982 
 
 
 
 
 AU
S 
U
S 
N
Z 
CA
N 
IR
E 
U
K 
IT
A 
JA
P 
FR
A 
GE
R 
FI
N 
S
UI 
AU
T 
BE
L 
NE
T 
DE
N 
NO
R 
SW
E 
AU
S 
 79 82
0 
80 25 69 29 19
3 
26 30 25 21 6 12 24 14 20 33 
US 75  80 684 38 59 31 10
8 
29 31 17 46 13 33 41 29 40 33 
NZ 82
0 
72  84 13 13
6 
21 13
0 
16 20 8 21 6 14 19 21 7 17 
CA
N 
35 31
8 
40  13 33 13 43 11 12 8 8 6 12 16 7 27 17 
IR
E 
25 49 20 48  50
3 
39 18 69 57 58 42 25 65 76 57 27 63 
UK 70 60 16
0 
80 53
8 
 60 25 83 78 10
0 
10
4 
38 94 140 157 173 133 
IT
A 
30 33 20 32 38 57  10 145 107 33 15
4 
119 61 64 57 27 42 
JA
P 
21
5 
10
7 
14
0 
108 13 29 10  14 18 17 33 13 12 12 21 27 17 
FR
A 
25 32 20 28 63 75 14
2 
16  106 33 11
7 
44 163 86 50 67 54 
GE
R 
30 34 20 28 50 84 10
6 
18 136  75 17
9 
244 143 176 136 127 96 
FI
N 
25 22 20 32 63 10
3 
31 23 38 76  63 63 33 50 214 227 508 
SUI 25 36 20 28 38 67 12
2 
27 110 165 58  244 69 59 71 33 79 
AU
T 
10 16 20 20 25 36 12
2 
17 43 242 58 24
2 
 37 40 64 40 83 
BE
L 
15 28 20 24 50 95 60 11 176 139 33 11
3 
31  276 50 40 63 
NE
T 
15 29 20 20 75 10
6 
60 11 89 175 50 67 44 273  93 80 75 
DE
N 
15 31 20 24 50 14
3 
56 20 51 130 27
5 
83 63 47 91  340 471 
NO
R 
15 28 10 36 25 28
5 
25 28 30 122 24
2 
42 44 35 86 350  533 
SW
E 
30 37 20 36 63 12
8 
43 21 51 95 50
8 
79 81 67 83 479 593  
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Formula for calculating individual data points =                                  100(Xy→x + My→x) / (Xy(total) + My(total))                         x 100 
                                                                                     
────────────────────────────────────────────── 
                                                                                     100(Xx(total) + Mx(total)) / Σ (Xx1(total)→Xx18(total) + Mx1(total)→Mx18(total)) 
 
 
 
 
Where: i) the numerator equals the percentage of a particular country’s trade – exports plus imports – with another 
country; 
 ii) the denominator equals the size of that latter country’s traded sector –incoming plus outgoing – 
expressed as a percentage of the sum of all 18 countries’ traded sectors, thereby controlling for the effects 
of differences in the relative size of different countries’ traded sectors; 
 iii) all figures are weighted by being multiplied by 100 – thus, a recorded figure of 100 represents direct 
proportionality between the extent of trade between one country and another (expressed as a percentage of 
the former’s overall traded sector) and the latter’s percentage share of all 18 countries’ traded sectors. 
 
 
For instance: i) for data point [X6, Y11], FIN/UK, Finland’s trade with the UK in 1982 amounted to US$1,413m of 
exports and US$977m of imports, or 9.0% of Finland’s total traded sector of US$26, 489m; 
 ii) the UK’s aggregate traded sector of US$196,630m amounted to 8.7% of the 18 countries’ cumulative traded sector 
of US$2,250,936m; 
 iii) dividing 9.0 by 8.7 and multiplying by 100 gives a weighted figure of 103, showing that Finland traded 
slightly more with the UK than would be expected purely on the basis of the size of the UK’s traded 
sector. 
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